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Abstract
My purpose is to identify, examine, and synthesize the main
factors that determine the ability of Hungarian higher education
institutions to adopt the Bayh-Dole model of university technol-
ogy transfer. I begin by discussing a set of fundamental ques-
tions, such as the various interpretations of the recent changes in
the posture of institutions, the criticism of the novel approach to
the role of universities in society, and the main causes behind the
increasing entrepreneurial activity of institutions. I scrutinize
the determinants of university entrepreneurship at three interre-
lated levels: national (governance model of universities), orga-
nizational (university culture), and personal (individual scien-
tist). I conclude that, in Hungary, none of the three components
of the proposed framework facilitates the entrepreneurial trans-
formation of institutions in line with the Bayh-Dole model.
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1 Introduction: the entrepreneurial transformation of
universities
Higher education institutions (henceforth, institutions / uni-
versities) have always played a central role in the development
of towns, regions, and nations. Their contribution to society’s
welfare has traditionally been indirect, i.e. by education, train-
ing, and the open dissemination of research results. In the last
one and a half or two decades however, in parallel with the rise
of various economic and social concerns, these unwritten norms
of how universities should function seem to be eroding.
“Knowledge-producing institutions have become more im-
portant to innovation as knowledge becomes an increasingly
significant element in new product development” [22]. Insti-
tutions that are active in commercializing research results (i.e.
in technology transfer) and especially in patenting, licensing,
or new firm formation are often referred to as “entrepreneurial”
[30]. Although it is commonly referred to as technology trans-
fer, commercializing inventions often goes beyond knowledge
transfer and can rather be interpreted as a marketing process
(especially in the case of spin-off ventures) [45]. [54] also high-
lights the need for “customer orientation” when devising univer-
sity research and development (R&D).
Etzkowitz [17] coins the term entrepreneurial university to
describe the increased technology transfer activity of higher ed-
ucation institutions that, as a result of closer industry ties, play
an enhanced role in innovation and economic growth. Accord-
ing to Etzkowitz’s much-quoted argument [20], higher educa-
tion institutions have undergone a double transformation: the
“first revolution” came during the 19th and 20th centuries, when
in addition to education research became a legitimate mission
of institutions. Towards the end of the 20th century, a “second
revolution” took place, which brought about “the translation of
research findings into intellectual property, a marketable com-
modity, and economic development” [24]. The commercializa-
tion of research results is often referred to as the “third role”
or “third mission”, which is “particularly well developed” in an
entrepreneurial university [70].
Etzkowitz, one of the most prolific writers on the en-
trepreneurial transformation of universities, claims that aca-
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demic entrepreneurship [italics added] is, on the one hand, an
extension of teaching and research activities and, on the other
hand, the internalisation of technology transfer capabilities, tak-
ing a role traditionally played by industry. It is this ‘capitali-
sation of knowledge’ that is the heart of a new mission for the
university, linking universities more tightly to users of knowl-
edge and establishing the university as an economic actor in its
own right [19].
Clark [9] examines five European universities in five dif-
ferent settings, and calls for five elements as the “irreducible
minimum” to make up an entrepreneurial university: (1) “the
strengthened steering core” refers to greater managerial capac-
ity; (2) “the expanded developmental periphery” implies that
in order to link up with outside organizations, entrepreneurial
institutions create units that reach across traditional university
boundaries; (3) “the diversified funding base” denotes the fact
that, in addition to government support, second and third stream
sources are considered as an opportunity; (4) “the stimulated
academic heartland” calls for changes to be realized at depart-
mental level as well; while (5) “the integrated entrepreneurial
culture” requires the transformation to result in a new organiza-
tion culture.
Slaughter and Leslie [64] introduce the concept academic
capitalism to pinpoint the growing involvement of institutions
in market activity. On the basis of surveys at two Australian
universities, the authors find that faculty members in general re-
gard the costs of academic capitalism small as compared to its
benefits. Slaughter and Leslie argue that technology transfer “is
one of the most direct forms of academic engagement with the
market, and as such, a signifier of the issues that academic capi-
talism presents” (p. 139).
The “Mode 1 / Mode 2” theory [28] and the “Triple Helix”
model [23] also indicate a novel way of scientific knowledge
production. Both models represent a non-linear approach to
innovation and a pluralistic, interdisciplinary view of the na-
tional innovation system (NIS). In addition to Mode 2, Triple
Helix asserts that the actors of the NIS take the role of each
other: universities engage in entrepreneurial tasks (e.g. knowl-
edge marketing and company creation), enterprises increasingly
share knowledge among each other and with universities, while
the government takes the role of venture capitalists [22, 25].
MIT is considered the finest exemplar of the entrepreneurial
universities. Far ahead of its time, early in the 20th century, MIT
institutionalized theretofore informal university-industry tech-
nology transfer: it created a patent system to protect intellec-
tual property (IP), invention search mechanisms to identify ap-
plicable technology within the institution, committees to evalu-
ate inventions, and a technology transfer office (TTO) to assist
the commercialization of research results. The success of MIT
was primarily due to the fact that it “combined the research uni-
versity’s ‘linear model’ with the land grant university’s ‘reverse
linear model’ predicated upon deriving research goals from soci-
etal needs” .[21] Stanford University, another prototype of aca-
demic entrepreneurship, developed its technology transfer skills
in parallel with the rise of Silicon Valley. Despite these early
archetypes, university technology transfer in the U.S. began to
receive increased attention from scholars only in the aftermath
of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980). The Bayh-Dole (BD) legitimized
and institutionalized university technology transfer by granting
rights over faculty’s research results to the institution.
In Europe, universities have been seen as major contributors
to national and regional economies, and especially through the
process of commercializing research results, since buzzwords
such as “competitiveness” and “knowledge-based society” en-
tered political environments (COM, 2005). Policymakers in-
creasingly consider knowledge as a source of economic growth
and intend to boost the “marketization” of academic science
by changing the legislation of higher education and that of IP,
as well as the structure of research funding [47]. In Hungary,
the Innovation Act (2004) in tandem with new funding mecha-
nisms for university research gave way to similar developments
to those of the BD in the U.S.
On the basis of the above considerations, the main aim of this
paper is to estimate the capacity of Hungarian universities to
conform to the BD model. Several questions arise regarding this
objective. For example, it is far from clear whether institutions
rooted in an Eastern European post-socialist context show the
same patterns of entrepreneurial transformation as their Amer-
ican or Western European counterparts. Although European
decision makers demonstrate a great preference for emulating
U.S. research policy, it is unlikely that measures modelled after
the BD will deliver the same results in a different institutional
framework. Can Hungarian universities be entrepreneurial?
Should technology transfer be institutionalized and profession-
alized, or it can be achieved on an ad hoc basis as well? Is
the US-system a good role model for a post-socialist transition
economy? Has the BD been the main reason behind the en-
trepreneurial transformation of American institutions? Should
universities become entrepreneurial at all?
With the ambition of finding answers to these questions, I
have studied literature on academic entrepreneurship and visited
(formal and informal) forums of university technology transfer
officers in Hungary. I also conducted interviews with managers
of TTOs at seven prominent Hungarian research universities.
My intention was to observe institutions’ efforts to centralize
technology transfer and to take account of the problems they en-
counter while doing so. I used the results of these exploratory in-
quiries to understand and describe the phenomenon of university
entrepreneurship in Hungary (in relation to international litera-
ture), to identify problem-areas and to form hypotheses for fur-
ther research. Before having a closer look at the development of
university entrepreneurship in Hungary, first, I give voice to the
critics of the third mission to underscore that the entrepreneurial
transformation of institutions is not welcomed with equal en-
thusiasm by scholars. Second, I review the pressures for change
in the posture of institutions, with special regard to (what I be-
Per. Pol. Soc. and Man. Sci.72 Ádám Novotny
lieve are) the most important factors: the decrease in govern-
ment funding and the spread of BD-type legislation. In the main
part of the paper, I examine the factors that influence Hungarian
universities’ capacity to transform hitherto ad hoc technology
transfer practices into an organized model in line with the BD,
at three intertwining levels: national (university governance),
organizational (university culture), and personal (the individual
scientist).
2 Controversy about the new mission of higher
education institutions: should universities go en-
trepreneurial?
“The European Union has adopted the goal of becoming the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based society in the
world because it sees knowledge production and diffusion as the
engine of economic and social progress” [61]. Accordingly, the
EU increasingly urges universities to adopt a third mission so
that they can live up to the expectations of being in the heart of
the knowledge-based economy:
Co-operation between universities and industry needs to be
intensified at national and regional level, as well as geared more
effectively towards innovation, the startup of new companies
and, more generally, the transfer and dissemination of knowl-
edge. From a competitiveness perspective it is vital that knowl-
edge flows from universities into business and society. The two
main mechanisms through which the knowledge and expertise
possessed and developed by universities can flow directly to in-
dustry are the licensing of university intellectual property, and
spin-off and startup companies [italics added] [13].
Two important concerns arise from the Commission’s ap-
proach: (1) Are traditional academic values at stake if univer-
sities increase attention on commercializing research results?
(2) By emphasizing licensing and spin-off creation as the main
mechanisms of knowledge transfer, the EU seems to forget about
many, perhaps more important channels of academia-industry
interaction. In what follows, I examine these concerns in more
detail.
Treating universities as “patent-factories” is not welcomed at
all. Bok [4], already at the beginning of the 1980s, argued that
technology transfer “could alter the practice of science in the
university” and threatens “the central values and ideals of aca-
demic science” (p. 142). Indeed, the Mertonian norms or rather
ideals about the driving principles of academic science (commu-
nality, universalism, disinterestedness and organized scepticism)
are in stark contrast to the emerging philosophy of academic
capitalism [64]. Instead of publishing research results, technol-
ogy transfer emphasizes IP rights and the public good achieved
by commercializing inventions. The BD and resulting univer-
sity IP policies also support this patent-centred philosophy of
knowledge transfer.
Critics of intellectual protectionism argue that government
funded research should be made available to all parties inter-
ested, and that public interest is harmed by monopolies over
new technologies, as they eliminate the free exchange of re-
search information and knowledge accumulation. Authors (e.g.
Gibbons et al., Hazelkorn, Hellström, Lundvall) [28, 32, 33, 40]
express concerns that increased pressures for relying on exter-
nal sources can divert researchers’ attention from their original
goals to those of the source of finance.
Nybom [49] believes that the massive politicization of higher
education in Europe has led to detrimental changes within
universities: in the name of “deregulation and marketization”
universities have been proclaimed “anti-innovative” and “ill-
adjusted to the real social, economic, etc. problems” (p. 7). Ny-
bom depicts a rather dark picture of the recent trends in higher
education, by which universities “through a deadly combination
of political incompetence, ideological blindness, economic stu-
pidity, and academic arrogance are gradually disappearing as a
living form of institutional order” (pp. 9-10).
Mowery and Sampat [43] also profess the view that govern-
ment initiatives are based on a poor understanding of the “full
spectrum of roles” that universities perform in a knowledge-
based society. The authors highlight that the BD model ig-
nores the fact that channels of open science, such as publica-
tions, conference presentations, informal interactions between
faculty members and industry researchers, or faculty consulting
play a much more important role in university-industry interac-
tions than the formal channels of patent licensing and spin-off
creation (see Tab. 1).
Tab. 1. Importance of Channels of Information Flow from Public Research
to Industrial R&D (as perceived by R&D managers of manufacturing firms lo-
cated in the U.S.) [11]
Information Source % Rating it as “Moderately” or
“Very” Important for Industrial R&D
Publications & reports 41.2
Informal interaction 35.6
Meetings & conferences 35.1
Consulting 31.8
Contract research 20.9
Recent hires 19.6
Cooperative R&D projects 17.9
Patents 17.5
Licenses 9.5
Personal exchange 5.8
Mowery and Sampat highlight that the various explanations
of the new mission of universities (e.g. Triple Helix, Mode 2)
tend to disregard the tensions between the different roles of in-
stitutions and thus give little support to policymakers [43]. The
authors also reckon that there are no proven systems for mea-
suring and evaluating university-industry interactions in national
economies, which points to the lack of strong analytical frame-
work for understanding the role of universities within the NIS
(ibid.).
As shown by the above examples, the marketization of aca-
demic science has resulted in a struggle between the traditional
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academic culture and the market culture [16,23, 41,48], and led
to policymakers’ misunderstanding of the ways how universi-
ties contribute to industrial innovation and economic compet-
itiveness. The guiding principle for blending entrepreneurial
thinking with traditional academic values may be that economic
considerations should be welcomed until they do not pose a
threat to academic values: “Universities should function in an
entrepreneurial fashion, but in an academic sense, not in an
economic sense”, ergo external funding should always be ob-
tained in order to support academic values and not for its own
sake [57].
3 Pressures for change: why universities go en-
trepreneurial?
Since the mid-1990s the nature of universities has changed
dramatically resulting in a shift from the ivory tower atmosphere
towards the philosophy of academic capitalism. This transfor-
mation has been induced by both “technology pull” and “tech-
nology push” motives, which simultaneously increase the level
of entrepreneurship within institutions [59]: on the one hand,
the growing scientific context of industrial production raises
demand for university innovation (especially in the fields of
biotech, nanotech, informatics and cognitive sciences), on the
other, as a result of shrinking public funding, universities be-
come more proactive in dealing with market needs [65]. Mow-
ery and Sampat [45] believe that industry demand is the more
dominant driver of university innovation: on the basis of [11] the
authors argue that in most industries (with the exception of phar-
maceuticals) university research plays little if any role in gener-
ating industrial R&D projects. Instead, it is customers or manu-
facturing operations that create demand for university R&D. In
Hungary however, industry demand for university R&D is rather
fragmented, business contracts in general are of very small value
[14,31], which can hamper institutions in developing their inno-
vation capacity [37].
Authors mention several factors that have facilitated the en-
trepreneurial transformation of institutions. These, among oth-
ers, include the drop of government funding to higher education
[27, 51, 70], the emergence of public debates about the role of
universities in society [4,9,13] the adoption of BD-type legisla-
tion [63,71]; government expectations to increase the economic
returns of publicly funded research [3, 62] the rise in the avail-
ability of venture capital and the increase in the supply and mo-
bility of researchers [59] the development of fields of sciences
with increased potential for technology transfer (e.g. biotech-
nology and molecular biology, computer science, and more re-
cently nanotechnology); the growing scientific and technical
content of industrial production [27] and the Supreme Court de-
cision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that permitted the patenting
of living organisms and thus opened the way for a torrent of
biotechnology innovations [42].
In the post World War II years, Western countries witnessed a
massive expansion of higher education, which transformed the
theretofore elitist systems into mass education. The economic
measures following the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s en-
tailed the review of the systems of education. Decreasing in-
stitutional funding raised cost pressures within university oper-
ating budgets and intensified the rivalry for research grants and
business contracts. In Eastern Europe, the challenges that West-
ern countries had three to four decades to tackle, all came right
after the regime change.
To accelerate universities’ transformation into the motor of
economic development, governments have shifted the direction
and channels of budgetary funding from basic to applied sci-
ences and from normative to competitive resources respectively.
The reduction in shares of resources from government in paral-
lel with the aforementioned changes in the structure of funding
resulted in a more aggressive, entrepreneurial behaviour of uni-
versities. In response, institutions developed strategies and or-
ganizational forms to fully benefit from second-stream (e.g. re-
search grants and contracts from government) and third-stream
income sources (e.g. grants, contracts, donations, royalty pay-
ments, and licence fees from private companies, incomes from
spin-offs, student fees) (see Fig. 1). In Hungary, without govern-
ment grants and business R&D contracts, institutions could not
even provide for the basic equipment needed for education and
laboratory work [14,36]. Besides, the growing share of compet-
itive (research) grants within budgetary resources led to growing
uncertainty in obtaining funding and thus in the day-to-day op-
eration of institutions [15].
The “Pandora’s box” of university technology transfer was
opened in the U.S. nearly three decades ago. The BD Act
of 1980 permits institutions to retain title to inventions devel-
oped on grounds of government funding. In exchange for IP
rights, universities are required to file for patent protection, ac-
tively promote and attempt to commercialize the invention, as
well as to share royalties with the inventor. Researchers are re-
quired to disclose inventions to the university-TTO, which in
exchange, evaluates the commercial potential of the invention,
files for patent protection if necessary, and attempts to market
the invention by contacting firms that are interested in licensing
the technology, or entrepreneurs capable of launching a startup
based on the new technology [63]. In the centre of the process
is the TTO-officer, whose personal networks and knowledge of
the potential users of the technology are crucial for the success
of the model (see Fig. 2).
In the aftermath of the BD, licensing soon became a measure
for prestige and potential for advanced, industry-oriented re-
search, attracting a multitude of institutions into the technology
transfer arena in the U.S. [3]. In just ten years (1980-1990) the
number of institutions with a TTO increased from twenty-five
to two hundred (from offices of a single person at less research
oriented universities to ones with 30-50 employees at MIT, Stan-
ford or the University of California), while the amount of uni-
versity patents grew from three hundred to almost 2,000 [18].
In the first ten year of the “BD regime”, universities only hoped
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Fig. 1. Funding channels for higher education.
Source: [39] with minor adjustments
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to earn enough to pay for the running of the TTO, but revenues
from technology transfer quickly began to rise.
As emphasized by Etzkowitz [18], the Act created a sta-
ble, universal, and secure framework for academia-industry-
government relations and made research universities an “explicit
part of the U.S. innovation system” (p. 115). Other popular ar-
guments in favour of the Act are that on the one hand, by 1980
the federal government owned title to 28,000 patents but it had
licensed only fewer than 4 percent of them; on the other, prior
to the Act companies were not guaranteed exclusive marketing
rights needed to regain investments into technology develop-
ment [18, 29]. Debates over the economic competitiveness of
the U.S. at that time also contributed to the nearly unanimous
vote in favour of the Act [44].
Advocates of the BD hold the view that the model not only
enhances university budgets, but through product sales it in-
creases government tax revenues, employment, and eventually
economic growth. Critics of the model contradict the signifi-
cance of BD-type legislation in facilitating knowledge flow from
the academic sphere to the business sector. Mowery and Sampat
[43] reason that the hype around the BD is not supported by em-
pirical evidence, as the patenting and licensing activity of U.S.
institutions, as well as the growth in the numbers of TTOs and
staff began to accelerate well before the passage of the Act. Ex-
amining three leading U.S. institutions, Mowery, Nelson, Sam-
pat and Ziedonis conclude that “Bayh-Dole is only one of sev-
eral factors behind increased patenting and licensing” (p. 27),
but not as determinative as it is frequently asserted to be.
4 The entrepreneurial capacity of Hungarian universi-
ties
The main factor that determines the market-sensitivity of uni-
versities in Hungary is historical. After WWII, the Hungarian
R&D sector was tailored in line with the Soviet model: the au-
tonomy of universities practically disappeared, research institu-
tions were placed outside the academic sphere, and university-
industry relations weakened. During the economic hard times
following the regime change, R&D and innovation significantly
receded as a priority issue [37]: the number of research staff and
the amount of R&D expenditures (and especially that of busi-
nesses) declined in parallel with firms’ willingness to innovate.
Examining two Hungarian technical universities, Török and Pa-
panek [66] find that faculty members collaborate with industry
only occasionally, while regular contract research is less typi-
cal. Havas and Nyiri [31] highlight that in Hungary the level
of university-industry cooperation was rather low in comparison
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to the EU15 between 1999 and 2001, and it further declined in
the period of 2002-2004. Until the end of the 1990s, Hungarian
science policy was based on the linear conception of innovation,
thus funding programs did not support interactivity between in-
stitutions and industry. It was only at the turn of the millennium,
when economic trends had been somewhat normalized that the
government began to stimulate interactive technology transfer.
Following the U.S. example, several EU members (Belgium
in the 1990s; Germany, Norway and Denmark in 2001; Austria
in 2002; Hungary in 2004; Italy in 2005; etc.) adopted some
form of the BD framework in the past two decades, expecting
to boost their innovation performance. The “Hungarian BD”,
enforced in 2005, rearranged the regulation of IP born by insti-
tutions: the Innovation Act requires universities to establish IP
policies, allows faculty members to set up utilizing enterprises
(spin-offs), and permits them to be hired by these spin-off com-
panies [6]. Legal incentives have been coupled with competitive
funding for applied research, provided by mechanisms of the In-
novation Fund. The Fund is a novel way of financing R&D and
innovation programs in Hungary: it rests on a turnover-based
levy of businesses, complemented with a similar amount trans-
ferred by the government [34].
Depending on the commitment of university administrators
and the spheres of interests within institutions, universities em-
barked on to institutionalize technology transfer with varying
resilience: some have established university-TTOs and even for-
mulated invention evaluation and protection systems, mainly
drawing on foreign examples, but others have shown slight will-
ingness to go further than the minimal formalities (e.g. web
publishing of university IP policies) required by the law.
In what follows, I examine the factors I regard as highly sig-
nificant relative to institutions’ ability of implementing the BD
model. I depict the determinants of university entrepreneur-
ship in an onion model of three concentric circles (see Fig. 3):
(1) The system of university governance is determined at na-
tional level, when the government sets the degree of univer-
sity autonomy in financial and academic issues by legislation.
(2) Since culture is the most difficult organizational attribute
to change [60], it has a strong bearing on universities’ capac-
ity for entrepreneurial transformation. (3) In the centre of the
framework, there is the individual scientist, whose attitude to
entrepreneurship is highly dependent on the organizational and
socio-economic setting. All three components of the framework
are embedded in and shaped by the social, economic, and cul-
tural environment of the given country that is Hungary in the
present case.
University governance
The governance model of higher education influences insti-
tutions’ ability to develop their entrepreneurial skills to a great
extent, as well as their capacity to adapt to and profit from envi-
ronmental changes. University governance systems today have
to meet different challenges to those of previous centuries [36].
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According to [9], the coordination of higher education systems
is determined by the distribution of power between three forces:
the overnment, the market, and the academic community. In
the European continental model, also characteristic of Hungary,
the central state has a strong influence on how universities are
governed: it regulates access conditions, the curriculum, the
degree requirements, and the appointment and remuneration of
academics [38]. The academic community (represented by the
Senate) also maintains considerable authority in internal univer-
sity affairs, especially regarding the content of education and re-
search. The third apex of the triangle, university administration
is relatively weak and has narrow latitude for exercising power.
Van Vught [69] entitles the European tradition a “state control
model”, as contrasted to the “state supervising model”, which
is typical of the Anglo-American tradition. Fielden ( [26] dis-
tinguishes between four models of university governance (“State
Control”, “Semi-Autonomous”, “Semi-Independent” and “Inde-
pendent”), and stresses that higher education systems in general
are gradually shifting from state control towards one of state su-
pervision (p. 11). Close state control was lacking in British
and U.S. systems, which has been a major reason for American
institutions’ higher responsiveness to market needs [2, 58].
In spite of the regime change, the close government control
over the financial management of Hungarian universities did not
relieve. Although the Higher Education Act of 1993 strength-
ened the autonomy of the academic sphere, economic indepen-
dence of institutions was not even in question [1]. In addi-
tion, regulations on university budget became more stringent,
bureaucratic, and confusing, while except for fee-paying teach-
ing programs, entrepreneurial activities were regarded undesir-
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able [35]. Declining public funding, growing competition for
students, and the need for adapting curricula to market econ-
omy needs have raised pressures on universities for a greater
degree of self-management. But the slow adjustment of the reg-
ulatory framework to the new environment has embroiled insti-
tutions into a “schizophrenic situation”: on the one hand, they
are urged to become more entrepreneurial and market-oriented,
on the other, they have to submit to close government control,
and especially regarding financial issues [46].
Besides aligning Hungarian higher education to the European
system in line with the Bologna process, the new Higher Ed-
ucation Act (ratified in 2007) attempted to professionalize the
governance of institutions in order to increase the efficiency of
university operation. But the high ambitions have fallen by way-
side due to the conflicting interests of the state and universities
[55], when institutions objected to increasing the influence of
“outsiders” (e.g. government officials, private sector experts) on
internal university affairs. The running of Hungarian universi-
ties was described as “amateurish” by Barakonyi [1] prior to the
new Act, and the situation has not changed much since then.
Albeit universities now enjoy a relatively high autonomy in en-
trepreneurial issues (e.g. they can obtain loans, start business en-
terprises, and commercialize IP), their governance on the whole
remained unchanged (they kept their “government institution”
status) while their management (internal governance) can still
be regarded as collegial, that is characterized by equal sharing
of authority by leading professors.
Despite political ambitions to see public universities led by
strong, outward-looking professionals, it seems that the shift to-
wards state supervision and managerial culture is unlikely to
take place without universities’ consent. Organizational changes
required for full transformation can easily fall victim of the con-
flicting interests between university administration, academic
scientists, and the government. It seems that universities are
more afraid of the market forces than they believe in their bene-
fits to higher education, and indeed, institutions are quite content
with the present situation, which resembles more to “market so-
cialism” than to market economy [56].
University culture
Universities in Hungary and in most European countries (with
the exception of the U.K.) can be regarded as highly “bureau-
cratic” and “oligarchic” with typical Weberian and Humboldtian
structures. The greatest disadvantage of this model is that it is
very resistant to change and the least interested in opening up to
the needs of the market and external stakeholders [38].
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s ideas on how universities should be
run have had a major influence on the construction, functioning
and organizational culture of European universities up to present
times. Von Humboldt envisioned a university in which knowl-
edge creation and transmission is uninterested and uncorrupted,
i.e. not influenced or hijacked by politics, the economy, or reli-
gion. In a Humboldtian institution academics enjoy “the greatest
possible autonomy” and have a conviction that besides impartial
education and research, they have no other social obligations
[50]. Even today, many scientists hide behind this ideology to
distance themselves from social responsibilities [68].
The fundamental characteristics of the Humboldtian univer-
sity model (high specialization of academics, organizational
fragmentation, high distribution of decision-making authority,
and the merit-based omnipotence of leading professors) can im-
pede quick, entrepreneurial decision-making often needed in the
course of day-to-day university-business interactions. As R&D
is usually carried out on interdisciplinary domain, requiring the
collaboration of faculty members from several fields of science,
Humboldtian structures can detain the successful completion of
large-scale multi-discipline research projects.
As van Vught puts it, extreme organizational fragmentation
can eventuate that the university becomes a random and ineffec-
tive federation of sovereign mini-states that are concerned only
with their own interests – they are not interested in the welfare
of their federal allies, nor of the institution as a whole, nor of the
society of which they form part [68].
Examining three Hungarian research universities, Veroszta
[67] finds that in spite of the growing dependence on market
forces, positions that require managerial decision making are
typically filled internally, by teachers or researchers. Hence,
there is a wide array of university heads in the same institution,
from ones with exceptionally strong entrepreneurial attitude to
others with strictly academic thinking. Due to this variation in
attitudes and the differences in the technology transfer poten-
tial of different fields of science, some departments have much
greater capacity to attract external sources of revenue than oth-
ers. Disparity in income-generating capabilities, along with the
high autonomy of departments and the lack of income redistri-
bution systems can give rise to strong inequalities among fac-
ulty members, and eventually deteriorate their attitude towards
entrepreneurship.
The individual scientist
In a “bottom heavy knowledge institution, grass-roots innova-
tion is a crucial form of change” [10]. Endeavours to introduce
organized technology transfer to Hungarian universities are un-
likely to succeed without understanding the motivations of the
individual scientist. At this point we should take a broader per-
spective, as research on university entrepreneurship, and espe-
cially at individual level, is embedded in that of entrepreneur-
ship. The key entrepreneurial traits as summarized by Chell [8]
are: the need for achievement, internal locus of control1, risk-
taking, proactive personality, entrepreneurial self-efficacy, per-
severance, intuitive decision-making style, social competence
(networking capability), and the need for independence.
1People with an internal locus of control (LOC) are those who believe that
they are in control of their own destiny. In contrast, people with an external LOC
conceive that fate has a dominating influence over their lives (Levenson, 1973;
as cited in Chell, 2008)[8].
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Examining the reasons behind the low level of spin-off cre-
ation in Hungary, Buzás [7] finds that researchers in general
have a low tolerance of risks and a high fear of failure, busi-
ness ties, and insecurity associated with entrepreneurship. These
negative associations are reinforced by scientists’ insufficient
business administration knowledge and entrepreneurial compe-
tences. In addition, it is highly demanding to perform as a re-
searcher and an educator simultaneously. On the basis of official
statistics, Papanek and Borsi [52] argue that “many Hungarian
researchers do not [even] think about making business use of
the research results achieved”. As universities in general as-
sess and reward faculty members by their publication and ci-
tation records, established promotion systems do not motivate
researchers either to increase their technology transfer activity.
Intrapreneurship, i.e. entrepreneurship within established or-
ganizations, is a more adequate term to describe scientists en-
gaged in technology transfer. Intrapreneurs are “entrepreneurial
individuals, who are able to innovate within traditional large
organizations, and who do so by challenging bureaucracy and
creating successful operations in spite of, rather than in line
with, the organizational culture and strategic aims of the com-
pany” [61]. Although some “academic intrapreneurs” [53] in
Hungary have managed to establish successful research enter-
prises outside traditional university structures, they tend to re-
sort to university infrastructure and goodwill without paying ad-
equate (or any) compensation to the institution. As a result only
a small fraction of the contract value, disclosed to legitimize
the use of research infrastructure, appear as university resource
[15]. This individualistic and sometimes unethical approach to
entrepreneurship can significantly hinder the efforts to central-
ize university technology transfer in Hungary. As explained
by Inzelt [36], the ideological basis of these private (or rather
“pirate”) academic ventures originates from socialist times, and
has served as a survival strategy for entrepreneurial academics
since the regime change. The practice emerged as a result of
researchers’ relatively low living standards and the lack of uni-
versity IP policies. Although by today all institutions have had
to formulate IP management policies to comply with the law
(including regulations about invention disclosure and income
distribution), ingrained reflexes can hardly be changed with the
stroke of a pen.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I discussed the various interpretations, critique,
and causes of the new mission of higher education institutions,
i.e. the commercialization of research results. I also examined
the factors that shape Hungarian institutions’ ability for adopt-
ing the Bayh-Dole model of technology transfer. These inves-
tigations are highly relevant at present, for at least two reasons.
First, the Innovation Act of 2004 requires Hungarian universi-
ties to centralize and professionalize hitherto ad hoc technology
transfer activities. Second, although academic entrepreneurship
has been examined (more or less) thoroughly in American and
Western European contexts, the development and characteristics
of the phenomenon have not been investigated and documented
extensively in Eastern Europe.
The Hungarian NIS experienced fundamental changes in the
first decade of the new millennium, when the government laid
down the cornerstones of the new innovation system: (1) the
BD-type innovation act, (2) the Innovation Fund, and (3) a gov-
ernment office for devising and implementing national R&D and
innovation programs. Emulating the BD is a very attractive so-
lution for satisfying the need for a modern research policy, but
the much-vaunted results of the model may not be achieved in a
country with a completely different institutional environment to
that of the U.S. The BD has been devised for a well-established
NIS with a long history of university-industry cooperation. En-
trepreneurial American institutions has adjusted their organiza-
tional structures with ease to the philosophy of the BD, but it is
more than doubtful that their Eastern European counterparts em-
bedded in a nascent innovation system can make similarly good
use of the ownership of IP.
In Hungary, the relatively weak links between universities
and the industry derives mainly from the country’s socialist past
that still has repercussions on the environment, governance and
culture of institutions, as well as on faculties attitude to en-
trepreneurship. Both literature sources and my empirical inves-
tigations suggest that, at present, neither the governance model,
nor the organizational culture of Hungarian institutions is in line
with the philosophy and mechanisms of the BD model. The
picture is more blurred at individual level. Whilst many re-
searchers have been inactive in technology transfer so far, there
is a small group with exceptionally developed entrepreneurial
competences and extensive industrial linkages. The former are
most likely to be indifferent to organized transfer, while the lat-
ter have already configured their business ties and working rela-
tionships, which they are reluctant to share with the university.
This conjecture however, should be treated with care and needs
to be further investigated.
Although the BD model of organized technology transfer is
in the embryonic stage of development in Hungary, it has al-
ready become clear that changes initiated solely by the state
will hardly be enough to alter norms, attitudes and patterns of
behaviour developed in the course of many years. Government
efforts to increase the role of universities in industrial innova-
tion are important but insufficient to make entrepreneurial think-
ing the standard within ivory towers. As Shattock [61] puts it,
“breaking down the bureaucratic barriers to entrepreneurialism
in universities is probably at least as important as incentivising
it through new financial mechanisms.”
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Tab. 2. Acronyms used in this paper
BD Bayh-Dole (Act)
HEI Higher Education Institution
IP Intellectual Property
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NIS National Innovation System
R&D Research and Development
TTO Technology Transfer Office
UTTO University Technology Transfer Office
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